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JEFFREY A. RAFFEL 
From Economic to Political Analysis 
of Library Decision Making* 
In general, the more critical the decision, the less useful a cost-benefit 
analysis is to library decision makers. Political analysis is required, 
and Easton's conceptual framework is presented to suggest the utility 
of political analysis. A list of normative issues is derived from raising 
descriptive questions about the politics of university libraries. 
IN 1969 THE M.I.T. PREss published a 
new volume, Systematic Analysis of 
University Libraries: An Application of 
Cost-Benefi.t Analysis to the M.I.T. Li-
braries, which might have signaled the 
entrance of economic analysis into the 
area of library decision making. As co-
author of the book, I anxiously awaited 
the reviews I hoped would follow. 1 To 
date all reviews missed what I regard as 
the major point of the book: Although 
helpful, an economic analysis of a uni-
versity (or public) library is insufficient 
because libraries operate as political sys-
tems and thus improving libraries re-
quires political analysis. 
The purpose of this paper is not only 
to argue that political analysis of uni-
versity and public libraries should be 
undertaken in conjunction with eco-
nomic analyses but also to apply a spe-
cific theoretical framework and concept 
to university and public libraries. The 
improvement of libraries requires an 
expansion of analysis beyond technical 
discussions of procedural changes and 
per item costs to the broader utilization 
of social science theory and research. 
In the past two decades both econo-
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mists and political scientists have ex-
panded their field of inquiry. Econo-
mists have become crucial figures in the 
analysis of governmental policy, espe-
cially in the measurement and an·alysis 
of governmental effectiveness through 
the methodology of cost-benefit analy-
sis.2 Political scientists have at the same 
time shifted their focus toward non-
governmental institutions, with some 
analyzing what were once thought to be 
nonpolitical governmental institutions 
(e.g., schools) and others, nongovern-
ments (e.g., private governments). As 
Mancur Olson has recently observed, the 
social science disciplines differ by their 
approaches and theoretical frameworks 
rather than by their subject matter.3 
Thus libraries, be they primarily public-
ly or privately operated, are fair game 
for the frameworks of political scien-
tists and economists. 
Each discipline includes an array of 
theoretical frameworks. The overall ap-
0 My frequent co-author, Robert Shishko, has 
tried to impart the essence of cost-benefit analy-
ses to his audience by telling them about an 
economist who, when asked if he liked sex, re-
plied immediately, "What are the alternatives?" 
I thank Bob Shishko for helping me to learn 
enough about economic analysis to criticize it, 
and I thank David Schulz and Daniel Rich for 
their insightful comments on earlier drafts of 
this paper. 
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proach of systems analysis stands out 
within each discipline as a fruitful way 
to improve libraries, specifically cost-
benefit analysis in economics and Eas-
tonian systems analysis in political sci-
ence. 
EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS 
Brief Description 
"Basically, economic analysis is the 
study of choice: the allocation of scarce 
resources among alternative uses, and 
the distribution of outputs among al-
ternative uses-that is, the classic ques-
tions of what and how much to pro-
duce, and who gets what products.''4 
Cost-benefit analysis is a subfield of eco-
nomic analysis: a specific application of 
economic analysis to nonmarket activity. 
We have defined cost-benefit analysis as 
the analytical examination of the costs 
and benefits of alternatives designed to 
meet specified objectives under various 
contingencies or states of the world.5 
Some differentiate cost-benefit analysis 
from cost-effectiveness analysis; the for-
mer referring to long-range financial ef-
fects (e.g., increased dollar income) 
and the latter to short-range measured 
output in nonfinancial terms (e.g., num-
ber of books circulated) .6 Although sys-
tems analysis has been used to refer to 
cost-benefit analyses, because its use is 
much more widespread, having applica-
tion in areas from computer technology 
to political analysis, we define systems 
analysis as the study of systems or com-
plexes or organized and interrelated 
parts, in terms of inputs, outputs, and 
internal functioning. 7 
Our definition of cost-benefit analy-
sis has already included most of the 
elements of the basic analytical frame-
work: costs, benefits, alternatives, and 
contingencies. What then is cost-benefit 
analysis? It is a way of looking at the 
world. Usually one starts from a set of 
objectives that a decision maker has in 
mind. The analyst finds measures of the 
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extent to which the objectives may be 
met. For example, if an objective of a 
library were to provide reading material 
to library users, then one measure of 
meeting this objective would be annual 
book circulation. One then examines the 
alternatives for fulfilling each objec-
tive. 
By constructing models (e.g., formu-
las, computer simulations), the analyst 
relates each alternative to its correspond-
ing costs and benefits (i.e., the degree 
to which objectives are met). The model 
is used across several contingencies or 
states of the world. Given the costs and 
benefits associated with each alternative 
in each contingency, a criterion or mea-
sure of preferredness (e.g., maximizing 
profits) is selected and the "best" al-
ternative is chosen. 
Figure 1 illustrates the cost-benefit 
procedure. Note that the method is actu-
ally circular-objectives are revised in 
light of feasibility and costs, new alter-
natives are created, models are refined, 
and the decision process is continuously 
in motion. 
Brief Critique 
The elements of the cost-benefit 
analysis model serve as the basis for a 
brief critique of the method. Attempts 
to define library objectives can lead to 
clarifications of purpose, yet they often 
result in futile searches for well-hidden 
goals obscuring the true clients of the 
library.8 While efforts to generate al-
ternatives to perform library services 
more efficiently and effectively are made, 
the question of the practicality and fea-
sibility of radically different ideas 
weights the ultimate analysis against in-
novative options. Relating costs to al-
ternatives becomes the key task, and 
numbers generated through cost model-
ing become the foci of economy drives. 
Benefit modeling, however, is weakest 
when the alternatives are most innova-
tive, e.g., public library programs based 
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Fig. 1 
The Basic Cost-Benefit Framework 
on distributing paperback books for dis-
advantaged patrons, university libraries 
handing out free copies of required ar-
ticles to students.9 Because the contin-
gencies studied most are those thought 
· to affect costs, not benefits, inflation of 
prices is emphasized over inflation of 
goals in serving users. 
Each of these difficulties is related to 
the political context in which the eco-
nomic study is conceived, implemented, 
and received. The basic political prob-
lem with economic analysis transcends 
operational and day-to-day difficulties 
and political intrigue. The basic politi-
cal problem centers on political conflict 
inherent in all our institutions, includ-
ing libraries. It is this conflict that is in-
appropriately dealt with or ignored in 
economic analysi~. 
The Political Problem with Economic 
Analysis: An Example 
Near the end of the data collection 
stage, the economic systems .analysis of 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy ( M.I.T.) libraries yielded a list of 
twenty library alternatives with associat-
ed costs and benefits.1o 
At this stage in the analysis several 
points were evident: 
1. Several alternatives were not worth 
considering. Alternatives offering 
fewer benefits at a higher cost than 
comparable alternatives were dis-
carded. For example, storing books 
off campus rather than on campus 
saved no money and resulted in 
losses of benefits to library users. 
2. Many conclusions with major pol- · 
icy implications were already war-
ranted. For example, inexpensive 
storage appeared to offer little fi-
nancial savings at a fairly high cost 
in benefits to a majority of the 
M.I.T. community. 
3. Although alternatives could be de-
scribed in terms of costs and bene-
fits with respect to the two major 
library objectives, more informa-
tion was required to select and rec-
ommend a subset of alternatives. 
For example, should the cost of 
reproducing copies of library ma-
terials be . reduced or should many 
course-required articles be distrib-
uted free of charge~ Should either 
be done with or without a decen-
tralization of library space?11 
It is at this point that cost-benefit 
analysis (and economic analysis) comes 
to a grinding halt. Cost-benefit analysis 
assumes that the objectives, even if un-
clear at the beginning of the analysis, 
can be specified at some point to the 
satisfaction of the decision maker. Cost-
benefit analysts recognize that multiple 
objectives may exist and suggest that the 
tradeoffs, the extent to which meeting 
one objective leads to a failure to meet 
other objectives, be specified and clearly 
displayed. But did our analysis indicate 
objectives that could be agreed upon? 
We decided to present the data on al-
ternatives derived from our analysis to 
the individual members of the univer-
sity community, thus to allow each to 
act as if he or she were the ultimate de-
cision maker.12 Because it would have 
been too costly to reach all members of 
the community, we drew a random sam-
ple of undergraduate students, graduate 
students, and faculty and research staff 
and presented them with twenty alterna-
tive changes, with a brief description of 
costs .and relevant benefit considerations, 
for the M.I.T. libraries. Respondents 
were given budgets of $0, $100,000, and 
$200,000 to spend for changes in the li-
braries. 
The analysis of the survey clearly in-
dicates that different subgroups of the 
M.I.T. community either had different 
objectives in mind or viewed different 
means as being best for meeting com-
mon objectives: 
The general conclusion is that the 
three major campus groups differ in 
the systems they would like the library 
to adopt. Undergraduates seek to ex-
pand and centralize the reserve collec-
tion by cutting research services. Grad-
uate students add lower Xerox prices 
and increased access to this list of de-
sired systems and would prefer to cut 
seating rather than cataloging. The 
faculty are the most willing to alter 
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book storage and cataloging and rela-
tivefy less desirous of a centralized re-
serve system .... 
The less a respondent reported 
using the libraries the more likely he 
was to select saving money on book 
storage and seating and to spend it 
on lower Xerox rates, departmental li-
braries, and an all-Xerox reserve sys-
tem. Low users thus tend to be out-
side-use oriented. The high users pre-
fer expanding seating, acquisitions, 
reference, and access to other collec-
tions. The high users thus are research 
oriented. We have concluded that the 
library has traditionally served one cli-
entele, the research oriented. There 
now appears to be, however, a second 
clientele, who spend few hours in the 
library and seek not the space but the 
materials in its collection. We believe, 
with as yet no proof, that many of 
those oriented to outside use prefer to 
work outside the library but are 
forced, primarily by the reserve system, 
to work in the library. We hypothesize 
that these users (and many other po-
tential users) could be served by a li-
brary emphasizing distribution as well 
as in-house facilities and services.13 
The M.I.T. analysis indicates that the 
alternatives faced by the M.I.T. library 
and university administrators involved 
major choices among various subgroups 
on campus. Furthermore, the analysis 
strongly suggests that decisions now fa-
vor faculty far more than students. 
The political problem with economic 
analysis is that there is no economic 
way to resolve differences among al-
ternatives meeting different objectives 
held by different subgroups; where po-
litical conflict exists a political solution 
must be found.14 This is not news to 
most economists. What library decision 
makers require is help in resolving these 
political conflicts. Presumably political 
analysis can help. 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
Political scientists would not agree on 
the nature of analysis necessary to deal 
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with such political conflict. Some would 
argue that an analysis should begin with 
a positivist or descriptive analysis of li-
braries with a focus on who decides and 
by what process. Others would argue 
that an explicitly normative or value 
based analysis, with a major focus on 
issues of equity and responsiveness, is 
required. Because neither of these ap-
proaches has been applied' to libraries, 
a first step falling between the norma-
tive and positive poles of political sys-
tems analysis has been chosen here. Be-
low, David Easton's descriptive frame-
work is used to raise the normative ques-
tions which library decision makers 
should be addressing.15 
Easton defines politics as the authori-
tative allocation of values for a society. 
In the past, many governmental institu-
tions, perhaps education is the best ex-
ample, have been viewed as being out-
side of the realm of politics. In 1969, 
in an introduction to a reader on the 
politics of education, the editor stated 
that "The idea that politics and public 
education are intimately related was 
practically unthinkable as recently as a 
decade ago. . . . At the very lea~t, any 
governmental process involving authori-
tative decisions on matters of public rel-
evance is of a political nature."16 Thus 
an entire literature dealing with the pol-
itics of education has developed.17 Cer-
tainly it would not be inappropriate to 
raise issues concerning the politics of 
public libraries and libraries at public 
universities. 
Studying the politics of university li-
braries derives from another expansion 
of political analysis to the area of pri-
vate government.18 Public governments 
have been defined as "those general as 
well as special-purpose associations and 
agencies either to which all inhabitants 
of a given locality are subject or of 
which all citizens are members"; and 
private governments are "those limited-
purpose associations or organizations, 
usually voluntary in membership, which 
exist both alongside and subordinate to 
public governments."19 Examples of 
private governments are corporations, 
trade unions, professional associations, 
and universities. Indeed, the public ver-
sus private distinction has become in-
creasingly blurred, especially as applied 
to universities, within the past decade.2o 
The basic questions one asks about pri-
vate governments are political: Are 
(and can) private governments (be) 
democratic?21 Related questions include: 
Who gets what, when, and how?22 
Although many alternative models of 
the political process exist, I believe that 
Easton's framework provides a useful 
analytical scheme for beginning a po-
litical analysis of libraries.2a 
Easton's Framework for Political 
Analysis 
Easton's model (see Figure 2) is sim-
ple in its conception but complex in its 
full description. Dye describes the the-
oretical framework succinctly: 
One way to conceive of public policy 
is to think of it as a response of a po-
litical system to forces brought to bear 
upon it from the environment. Forces 
generated in the environment which 
affect the political system are viewed 
as inputs. The environment is any con-
dition or circumstance defined as exter-
nal to the boundaries of the political 
·system. The political system is that 
group of interrelated structures and 
processes which functions authorita-
tively to allocate values for a society. 
Outputs of the political system are au-
thoritative value allocations of the sys-
tem, and these allocations constitute 
public policy. 
Systems theory portrays public pol-
icy as an output of the political system. 
The concept of "system" implies an 
identifiable set of institutions and ac-
tivities in society that function to 
transform demands into authoritative 
decisions requiring the support of so-
ciety. The concept of "systems" also 
l. 
.. 
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Fig. 2 
The Systems Model 
implies that elements of the system 
are interrelated, that the system can 
respond to forces in its environment, 
and that it will do so in order to pre-
serve itself. Inputs are received into 
the political system in the form of both 
demands and support. Demands occur 
when individuals or groups, in re-
sponse to real or perceived environ-
mental conditions, act to affect public 
policy. Support is rendered when in-
dividuals or groups accept the out-
come of elections, obey the laws, pay 
their taxes, and generally conform to 
policy decisions. Any system absorbs 
a variety of demands, some of which 
conflict with each other. In order to 
transform these demands into outputs 
(public policies) , it must arrange set-
tlements and enforce these settlements 
upon the parties concerned. It is rec-
ognized that outputs (public policies) 
may have a modifying effect on the en-
vironment and the demands arising 
from it, and may also have an effect 
upon the character of the political sys-
tem. The system preserves itself by: 
( 1) producing reasonably satisfying 
outputs, ( 2) relying upon deeply root-
ed attachments to the system itself, 
and ( 3) using, or threatening to use 
force.24 
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
AND UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES 
System Boundaries and Legitimacy 
The first question that arises is wheth-
er we can determine the boundaries of 
a political system. Throughout the 
M.I.T. library study we felt too con-
strained by the definition of the system 
we were studying, "the M.I.T. libraries." 
The use and evaluation of a university 
library are not independent of the book 
stores within (and without) the univer-
sity. To declare one a legitimate item 
for analysis and the other as outside of 
the area of analysis may be to miss the 
dynamics of the situation. It was sur-
prising to discover that a high-level, li-
brary acquisitions department staff 
member had not only made no effort to 
buy books from the Harvard Coop but 
also had never even been to this store, 
one of the world's largest bookstores. 
We were surprised to receive veiled 
threats by a department chairman after 
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we had measured his departmental li-
brary's floor-space without his permis-
sion. The quality of departmental li-
braries must surely determine the nature 
and degree of use of the main libraries. 
What units should be included in the 
library decision maker's domain? 
Output and Benefits 
Unlike Easton, it seems that the most 
fruitful political analysis must begin 
with the output stage of the political 
process. The analysis of output, done 
within the cost-benefit framework of 
the M.I.T. study, provides some signifi-
cant information and raises some im-
portant questions. 
The best tool available for analyzing 
policy was ( and often is) the library 
budget. But budgets are usually input 
based (e.g., cost of books purchased, 
cost of personnel salaries) rather than 
output or policy derived (e.g., cost of 
providing student services for course-
work). Perhaps even more interesting, 
the M.I.T. library budget, divided into 
parts among discipline-related libraries, 
was considered confidential. To para-
phrase one 'library administrator, "If 
the social scientists knew what we were 
spending on the physical science library, 
they'd start asking for more funds." 
A program budget analysis of the 
M.I.T. library seems to show quite clear-
ly who benefits from the current deci-
sion-making system. Only 23 percent of 
the total budget is used for providing 
required reading and facilities for 
studying, i.e., 'less than a quarter of the 
budget is devoted to nonresearch, course-
related studerit services. Of course, this 
overstates the antistudent bias, for un-
dergraduate and particularly graduate 
students devote much effort to research 
both inside and outside of courses. 
As noted in the discussion of the 
cost-benefit analysis of the M.I.T. li-
braries, the survey analysis challenges 
the myth of a unitary community.25 In 
fact it suggests that the allocation of 
benefits, if not costs, is weighted in fa-
vor of faculty and staff. Why should 
this be so? 
Demand and Democratic Process 
The concept of demand is a crucial 
one in Easton's framework. An analysis 
of demands made upon library adminis-
trators at M.I.T. would probably indi-
cate that a small number of senior fac-
ulty are the primary demanders. The li-
brary advisory committee contained no 
students; the administrators themselves 
spoke almost entirely of faculty com-
plaints.26 What channels, both formal 
and informal, are required for those 
affected by decisions concerning libraries 
to be adequately heard? 
The concept of demands is too limit-
ed for the political analysis of quasi-
public institutions like university li-
braries. Few preferences, defined as de-
sired states of affairs, even reach the 
level of demands. Easton concentrates 
on the reasons for the weeding of de-
mands and the attrition of preferences 
in the input stage of the political pro-
cess. We should ask, as does Easton, 
what institutions exist to filter and chan-
nel demands to library decision makers? 
How successful are different kinds of 
people within the university community 
in making their demands heard? To 
what extend should access be equalized? 
The mobilization of bias should also 
be considered crucial by library analysts. 
Several political scientists have criticized 
their discipline for the substantive con-
clusion that American institutions 
are open and responsive to minority 
groups.27 They argue that this optimistic 
substantive conclusion derives in part 
from a methodological problem, analyz-
ing only decisions made by public 
bodies. Backrach and Baratz ask, "Can 
the researcher overlook the chance that 
some person or association could limit 
decision-making to relatively noncontro-
versial matters, by influencing communi-
ty values and political procedures and 
I 
I ·~ 
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rituals?"28 By limiting political analysis 
to overt decisions, the role that elites 
play in mobilizing bias, i.e., in defining 
the nature and states of the political 
game, is overlooked. 
The mobilization of bias plays a criti-
cal role in library policy. One of our 
early suggestions at M.I.T. was that the 
price of reproducing pages of library 
materials within M.I.T.'s libraries should 
be reduced. Although the price was lat-
er decreased, the action was based upon 
an agreement that decreasing the price 
would ultimately increase revenue (i.e., 
elastic demand) and the system would 
remain self-supporting. But why should 
the dissemination of information by 
copying be self-supporting, and who is 
disadvantaged by this decision rule? 
Whereas many faculty have research 
grants, departmental resources, and rela-
tively high incomes, students are at a rel-
ative disadvantage in the marketplace. 
Libraries do not break even on provid-
ing books. Shoul~ they break even on 
copying materials for dissemination? 
One economist has made an argument 
that could have been based on the mo-
bilization of bias concept: 
Or why do not librarians diminish 
their stock of hard-cover books and 
acquire in their stead substantial in-
ventories of paperbacks which they 
would then give away free? We are 
inclined to reply, "Why, that would 
be crazy: our budget would soon be 
exhausted." And yet that is exactly 
what librarians are doing now except 
instead of giving books away free they 
are giving staff services away free.29 
Keller calls for implicit (or explicit) 
pricing of library services. 30 
Easton's framework, indeed all po-
litical frameworks, should include a ba-
sic economic concept of exit. Hirsch-
man argues that one mechanism of voic-
ing disapproval within the political as 
well as economic sector is exit, e.g., leav-
ing the organization or not consuming 
the product. 31 To what extent do po-
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tential library users seek other sources 
of information because of library in-
effectiveness? To what extent do some 
groups lack an effective means of in-
fluencing library decision makers by 
their inability to exit? 
The larger question that each of 
these points concerning demand raises 
is the appropriateness of democratic 
norms fo·r library decision making. 
Should libraries be run more democrati-
cally than they now are? 
Decision Making and Selecting 
Decision Makers 
The analysis of decisions and deci-
sion makers is a crucial aspect of Eas-
ton's framework The analysis of li-
brary decision making must reach be-
yond the traditional organizational 
bounds of the exercise of rationality. 
Lakoff has expressed the criticisms of 
traditional organizational analysis as 
follows: 
The study of organizational decision-
making studiously avoids asking the 
kind · of questions that would render 
the · study of decision-making genuine-
ly political. It does not ask what con-
stituencies are involved, or how the 
legislative is related to the executive, 
or how the authority of the decision-
maker is made accountable to those 
he represents. It does not ask whether 
the system is constitutional or just, 
legitimate or illegitimate. Instead the 
study of decision-making in organiza-
tions is confined to the question of 
whether and to what extent the func-
tions of management are exercised ra-
tion~.lly. The stress, in other words, is 
clearly on administration rather than 
government, on the integrative func-
'tion of social organization, on improv-
ing the efficiency of the decision-mak-
er. There is pnictically no attention 
paid to the question of whether people 
who are members of the ox:ganization 
or who are served by it have or ought 
to have control over it, whether they 
have any right (a term which would 
probably be considered altogether un-
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scientific by students of organization) 
to be consulted in the decision-making 
process or indeed to decide what form 
the process will take. 32 
In this conventional sense, the study 
of organizations, despite its focus on 
decision making, has been quite apoliti-
cal. 
Dye's identification of barriers limit-
ing rational decision making, in many 
ways analogous to criticisms of the use 
of cost-benefit analysis in libraries, 
might serve as a starting point for an 
analysis of library decision making. 
They are restated below as hypotheses. 
1. There are no community values 
which are usually agreed upon, 
but only the values of specific 
groups and individuals, many of 
which are conflicting. 
2. The many conflicting values can-
not be compared or weighted: for 
example, it is impossible to com-
pare or weight the value of indi-
vidual dignity against the loss of 
rare books. 
3. The environment of library poli-
cy makers, particularly the power 
and influence system, renders it 
impossible for them to see or ac-
curately weight many community 
values, particularly those values 
which have no active or powerful 
proponents. 
4. Library policy makers are not mo-
tivated to make decisions on the 
basis of community goals, but in-
stead try to maximize their own 
rewards-power, status, money, 
etc. 
5. Library policy makers are not mo-
tivated to maximize net goal 
achievement, but merely to satis-
fy demands for progress; they do 
not search until they find "the one 
best way" but halt their search 
when they find an alternative 
which "will work." 
6. Large investments in existing pro-
grams and policies (e.g., catalog-
ing systems, library buildings, and 
other "sunk costs") prevent policy 
makers from reconsidering alter-
natives foreclosed by previous de-
cisions. 
7. There are innumerable barriers to 
collecting all of the information 
required to know all possible pol-
icy alternatives and the conse-
quences of each alternative, in-
cluding the cost of information 
gathering, the availability of the 
information, and the time in-
volved in its collection. 
8. Neither the predictive capacities 
of the social and behavioral sci-
ences nor the predictive capacities 
of the physical and biological sci-
iences are sufficiently advanced to 
enable policy makers to under-
stand the full range of conse-
quences of each library policy al-
ternative. 
9. Library policy makers, even with 
the most advanced computerized 
analytical techniques, do not have 
sufficient intelligence to calculate 
accurately cost-benefit ratios when 
a large number of diverse politi-
cal, social, economic, and cultural 
values are at stake. 
10. Library policy makers have per-
sonal needs, inhibitions, and in-
adequacies which prevent them 
from performing in a highly ra-
tional manner. 
11. . Uncertainty about the conse-
quences of various policy alterna-
tives compels policy makers to 
stick as closely as possible to pre-
vious policies to reduce the likeli-
hood of disturbing, unanticipated 
consequences. 
12. The segmentalized nature of pol-
icy making in large library bu-
reaucracies makes it difficult to co-
ordinate decision making so that 
the input of all of the various 
specialists is brought to bear at 
the point of decision. 33 
' · 
Testing these hypotheses requires an 
analysis of the values and personal goals 
of library decision makers, the power 
of competing interests in universities, 
the incentive structures surrounding li-
brary administrators, and the nature of 
information available to decision mak-
ers. Significant normative questions fol-
low. Should library decision makers be 
more representative of those who use 
the libraries? Should the incentive struc-
ture for advancement in library admin-
istration be altered to better reflect user 
and potential user demand? 
LESsoNs FOR LmRARIANs 
Unfortunately, whereas economists 
can advocate that library decision mak-
ers try to maximize benefits at a given 
budget level, political scientists can of-
fer no clear-cut decision rule as an al-
ternative. This paper ends with ques-
tions that library decision makers should 
ask, but no simple answers of what ac-
tions to take if answers are found can 
be offered at this point. 34 Future re-
search is needed, although this obviously 
will not solve all the political problems 
of librarians. 
Following the more complete Easton 
model, library decision makers should 
ask themselves: 
1. What is the relevant library sys-
tem? Have I excluded a key com-
ponent that determines user behav-
ior but has traditionally fallen out-
side my purview? Can I coordinate 
decisions between my area and the 
additional area? 
2. What are the environmental con-
straints that appear to limit my 
discretion? Can they be altered? 
3. What groups (and individuals) 
make demands? Are they represent-
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ative of the potential users of the 
library? What preferences do not 
become demands? Are new or re-
vised mechanisms needed to en-
courage more demands? 
4. What is the general climate of 
opinion with respect to the library, 
e.g., support for library? Has the 
climate provided me with so much 
latitude that demands remain un-
met? What assumptions (of users 
or administrators) limit the con-
sideration of alternative policies? 
Who benefits from these assump-
tions? Who does not benefit? Can 
the asumptions be changed? 
5. Who plays a role in decisions about 
library allocations? To what extent 
are users or potential users in-
volved? To what extent are those 
affected by decisions helping to 
make them? 
6. Who benefits from (and pays for) 
the library? Does the budget show 
this? What services serve what 
groups? How well are they served? 
7. What feedback is available to the 
decision maker to evaluate current 
allocations? What mechanisms for 
feedback exist? Are they successful 
in bringing evaluations of users to 
decision makers? Do nonusers have 
access and do they use feedback 
systems? 
In brief, political systems analysis is 
analogous to economic systems analysis: 
it is a way of thinking. 
Woodrow Wilson, asked whether he 
had much difficulty in accustoming him-
self to practical politics, stated that af-
ter his experience in university politics 
at Princeton everything else seemed sim-
ple. It is time that we all recognized the 
politics of libraries and acted according-
ly. 
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